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SCIENCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEED FOR 
RECONSIDERING STATISTICAL 
METHODOLOGIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Elisa Vecchione* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper is part of a larger effort to analyze the United States vs. European 
Union dispute on biotechnology products1 before the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
Starting from May 2003, United States, Canada and Argentina requested 
consultations with the European Communities (hereinafter EC) regarding 
measures taken by the EC and its member States affecting the marketing of 
biotech products. According to United States, Canada and Argentina, the 
measures at issue were inconsistent with certain EC’s obligations under the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, the GATT 1994, the 
Agriculture Agreement and the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreement. The formal proceeding initiated when the consultations ended on 
February 2004 with the establishment of a panel by the Director-General of 
the WTO. 
                                                
* PhD candidate in Institutions, Economics and Law (IEL), Centre for the 
Comparative Analysis of Law and Economics, Economics of Law, Economics of 
Institutions (CLEI), University of Turin and Cornell Law School, 
elisa.vecchione@unito.it. 
For the support and helpful comments, the author thanks in particular Silvana 
Dalmazzone, Douglas A. Kysar, Theodore Eisenberg, John James Barceló III, Gilles-
Eric Séralini, Marco Ricolfi, Sergio A. Muro, Albert Azagra Malo, Matthias 
Kormaksson. 
1 In this paper, biotechnology products are also referred to as Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOs), except where differently stated. GMOs are food and feed 
products that have been altered using recombinant DNA technologies.  
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The dispute, also known as EU-Biotech, concerns the release of Genetically 
Modified Organisms (GMOs) in the European market. United States, Canada 
and Argentina accuse the European Union to impose a de facto moratorium on 
GMOs commercialization, due to “undue delay” in the approval procedure. In 
particular, the complainants claim that either the analysis of the parties’ risk 
assessment on GMOs was not reviewed, or the positive results of risk 
assessment were completely dismissed, for the approval of twenty four GMOs 
had never reached an end. Thus, in relation to the provisions of the SPS 
Agreement the European delay accounted for a non-necessary (“more trade 
restrictive than required”, Article 5.6) and non science-based (“maintained 
without sufficient scientific evidence”, Article 2.2) restrictive measure to 
trade. Besides, on the assumption that transgenic products are similar to their 
natural counterparts, the complainants accused the EC to provide a treatment 
less favorable than that accorded to like domestic products (Article III:4, 
GATT 1994) and, thus, to apply inconsistent levels of protections (Article 
5.5, SPS Agreement). 
This dispute is highly controversial in that it fuels the debate about the 
precautionary principle2, which has been adopted as a fundamental part of the 
European Union environmental strategy. On the other side, the WTO 
jurisprudence seems to reveal that precautionary measures would not be 
allowed if not grounded on scientific evidence. Unfortunately, scientific 
evidence is exactly what is lacking in many environmental concerns, 
including biotechnologies. But when risk assessment holds that the evidence 
of possible environmental and health-related harms is not reached “beyond a 
reasonable doubt”, State-based environmental measures are by default 
considered disguising restrictive measures to trade, which of course are in 
principle prohibited within the WTO regime. 
In the reading of the WTO Panel report on EU-Biotech dispute, recurrent 
notions such as “scientific knowledge”, “scientific uncertainty”, “statistical 
significance” seem to be abused both by the complainant (United States, 
Canada and Argentina) and the defendant (European Union), in that they are 
employed with no epistemological cognition. The parties’ argumentations 
result in high confusion, at least about what should be the core issue of the 
dispute: the legitimate protection of human health and biodiversity. 
The relevance of the scientific discourse for legal trials in general, and for the 
EC-Biotech dispute in particular, originates from its crucial, if not 
adjudicating, role. This consists in helping determining liability of the parties 
in legal trials, whether this has to be linked to compensation issues or, as in 
the EC-Biotech dispute, it affects member States policies.  Scientific and legal 
standards, as it is just suggested in this occasion and will be further treated in 
a second stance, can be mutually supportive, nonetheless they have to be kept 
separate for their genesis and heuristics are of different nature. The reason of 
raising this point is that the two standards seem in fact to overlap in the 
WTO proceeding. 
                                                
2 See note 3. 
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Thus, as a first step the aim of this paper is to apprehend the fundamental 
notions related to scientific knowledge in order to comprehend the stakes of 
the dispute and to explain their relevance within the legal trial. 
 
 
 
1. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: STATE OF THE DEBATE 
  
Since its first public acknowledgement, the precautionary principle has raised 
heated debate about environmental protection and health safety issues3. The 
controversy between managing the risk of possible future harm and taking 
precautionary measures has often been filtered by the alleged complementary 
opposition between rational economic principles and ethical – sometimes even 
irrational – value judgments. 
As I shall argue, such a simplified view of the debate is actually flawed. In 
fact, instead of sharpening the opposition between different disciplines, the 
precautionary principle has been creating room for new discussion and 
revision within the scientific, economic and legal communities, for different 
reasons.  
From a legal point of view, there exists no unique statement of the 
precautionary principle4, nor there is consensus about its location within the 
sources of international law5. By consequence, the numerous interpretations 
attached to it have hampered its application and implementation, resulting in 
poor relevance for international disputes. For these reasons, the precautionary 
principle has been sometimes demoted to a “precautionary approach” in order 
to keep it alive. 
As regard the economic discipline, the precautionary principle has raised 
controversy to the extent that it challenges the application of the traditional 
cost-benefit analysis to modern policy-making. The development of the 
option value literature has brought new responses to integrate uncertainty of 
                                                
3 The German principle of Vorsorgeprinzip, or foresight, appeared in the early 1970s 
and became a fundamental principle of German environmental law. Its English 
translation to “precautionary principle” has since then flourished in international 
statements of policy and had been introduced in numerous international treaties. The 
first time in occasion of the First International Conference on Protection of the North 
Sea (1984), then in the Rio Declaration from the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, the declaration stated:  “Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”.  
4 See, e.g., D. Vanderzwaag (1999), cataloguing 14 interpretations, and P. Sandin 
(1999), finding 19 interpretations.  
5 In particular, most of the debate concerns its relevance as international customary 
law. For those who are in support of that thesis, see e.g., T. Christoforou (2003); J. 
Cameron and J. Abouchar (1996). For those who oppose it, see e.g., P. Birnie and A. 
Boyle (2002). 
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future consequences and irreversibility of actions into decision-making 
process6. 
Within the scientific community, the development of ever innovative 
technologies has progressively forced to reconsider uncertainty and, 
accordingly, to develop new cognitive and legal device to deal with 
development risks. Rather than disrupting confidence in and within scientific 
disciplines, uncertainty has gradually emerged as additional valuable 
information to integrate in scientific models. Indeed, the value of research can 
be improved by reconsidering scientific methodologies, such as statistical 
inference, and by envisaging new ways for better communicating results 
(Kriebel et al., 2001; Lemons et al., 1997; Ingeborg and Traavik, 2002). 
The discussion about the precautionary principle in terms of its legal 
interpretation, economic rationale and usefulness to environmental policy-
making runs the risk to simply add one more new normative interpretation, 
without offering any real guidance7. Indeed, the debate seems endless when 
reduced to a fundamental opposition between two different perceptions of 
managing risk in everyday life – i.e. being risk averse and take precautions or 
being risk-lover if not fatalist – or further, between risk as science and risk as 
perception8. 
The dispute is far more complicated. That is why a major part of this chapter 
will be devoted to clarify the language of the precautionary principle by 
highlighting its relation to the scientific discourse. The aim is to detect those 
issues of guidance, if any, tumbling from the precautionary principle to help 
renovating the connection between expertise, science and public policy.  
This operation must begin with the very epistemological foundations of the 
precautionary principle in order to capture its relation to scientific knowledge, 
whose relevance is all the more crucial for environmental issues characterized 
by fundamental uncertainty as GMOs are. The rectification process will take 
advantage of insights from philosophy of science and epidemiology, and 
finally methodological issues related to statistical inference will be 
reconsidered. 
 
                                                
6 See e.g., K.J. Arrow and A.C. Fischer (1974); C. Gollier and N. Treich (2003).  
Furthermore, to the extent that the option value theory has developed with tight 
relation to investment theory, see e.g., A.K. Dixit and R.S. Pindyck (1994); C. Henry 
(1974). 
7 In reality, this would be sadly consistent with the phenomenon of treaty congestions 
that seems to characterize particularly the international environmental discourse. 
8 This feeling comes not only from general discussion with different people.  As it 
shall be seen, the arguments brought by the complainants and the defendant in the 
WTO dispute about Genetically Modified Organisms make it clear that there is a 
fundamental mismatch between their interpretations of the issue, so that in some 
points of the panel report the very impression is one of a dispute between deaf parties. 
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2.  SCIENCE AND POLICY – WHICH LOCATION FOR THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE?  
 
The relevance of the precautionary principle as guiding rule for 
environmental policies is still today contested through the allegation that this 
role is already performed by scientific knowledge. That is why much of the 
debate about the precautionary principle has to be analyzed in light of the 
relation between science and policy. 
The points of opposition raised by those who contest the usefulness of the 
precautionary principle can be summarized as follows: current regulatory 
provisions are inherently precautionary9; the precautionary principle 
advocates making decisions without adequate scientific knowledge; the risk in 
implementing it is that technological innovation could be undermined as far 
as development risks associated with it would challenge the outright proof of 
safety of a specific product (Holm and Harris, 1999). 
We are generally used to thinking about scientific knowledge as a field of 
neutrality and objectivity, which provides us with the tools to reach rational 
and shared agreements. In the same vein, we are used to conceiving policy as 
the field of compromise, contingency and, to some extent, of time-
inconsistency10, as it were something fluid and variable.  
Science has always been a synonym of certainty, stability, the expression of 
one common feature of all individuals, i.e. rationality, from which it has 
gained its power of persuasion. That is why the relation between science and 
policy is in our mind unidirectional, where the former provides rational 
grounds for decision-making. 
There exist however views conveying that this kind of opposition between 
science and policy is contestable (Bishop, 2000), and that more precautionary 
policies would create opportunities for scientists to rethink the way they 
conduct studies and communicate results (Kriebel et al., 2001; Lemons et al., 
1997; Ingeborg and Traavik, 2002).  
The crucial role of science, biology in particular, in environmental policies is 
unquestionable. However, the high degree of uncertainty stemming from the 
inherent complexity in many environmental issues requires a special attention 
insofar as it poses itself incomparable challenges to the science’s heuristic 
power. This fact induces questions about a possible reconsideration of 
scientific methodologies and, more provocatively, of possible contributions of 
the precautionary principle to that aim. 
Before illustrating the reasons of skepticism about scientific, primarily 
statistical, methodologies, it should be briefly recalled how statistical testing 
is built. 
                                                
9 This criticism can be fairly acknowledged, at least as far as the European 
Communities’ experience of highly complex process of approval for biotech products 
is concerned. 
10 The reference is made to the Barro-Gordon model (Barro, R. J. and Gordon, D. B., 
1983), which focuses on the occurrence of bias in independent monetary policy. 
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2.1. FREQUENTIST STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
At present, the dominant approach in risk assessment is given by frequentist 
statistical inference, even though a growing interest for Bayes methodologies 
is increasingly challenging the traditional system of statistical analysis 
(Malakoff, 1999; Carlin and Louis, 1996). 
Statistical inference is operated through two distinct but related processes: 
estimation and hypothesis testing (Ott and Longnecker, 2001). The former 
consists on computing a single value – called statistic – from the sample to 
make a point estimation of a population parameter. From point estimation of a 
statistic value, such as the mean µ, the median M, the standard deviation σ, 
inference is made about a population value. This information is then used as 
the basis for hypothesis testing formulation, in such a manner that the 
observed changes in point estimation (e.g. the mean decrease in insomnia 
among people assuming a particular drug) allows the researcher to assume 
that there is some relation between the use of the drug and the decrease in the 
rate of people suffering from insomnia. 
Statistical testing is made of two components, the research or alternative 
hypothesis and the null hypothesis. The aim is to prove an association 
between events by contradiction, i.e. by rejecting the null hypothesis, which is 
by default a no-effect hypothesis. Still, it is assumed that estimations are 
subject to random errors due to the size and composition of the sample. For 
this reason, hypothesis testing is constructed in such a way as to minimize the 
probability of producing either false positives (failing to detect an association 
when in truth it does exist) or false negatives (finding an association between 
two events when it does not exist). These errors are respectively identified as 
Type I and Type II. More precisely, Type I error is committed if we reject the 
null hypothesis when it is true, the probability of this being denoted by α. 
Type II error is instead committed if we do not reject the null hypothesis 
when it is false, the probability of this being denoted by β. α and β cannot be 
simultaneously minimized because they are inversely related, so that a choice 
of which error to minimize – and conversely which type of error to maximize 
– has to be made.  
Conventionally, Type I error is the one to be minimized. α denotes the 
rejection region, which is the region that contains the values of the statistic 
that contradicts the null hypothesis or in which it is very unlikely to see the 
null hypothesis supported. Most importantly, the rejection region determines 
the significance level of the test, for it constraints the size of the interval in 
which the results of the repeated tests are to be fall. The lower the 
significance level of the test and the rejection region, the more the level of 
precision is imposed, the less the probability of Type I error. 
 
 
 
 
 7 
2.2. BIAS AND UNCERTAINTY: CRITIQUES OF FREQUENTIST 
STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
Critiques have been moved to the conventional statistical methodology, based 
on the type of error to minimize, the extension of time and size of the 
experiment, and the way uncertainty is revealed. 
Concerning the first point, hypothesis testing is accused to favor less 
precautionary actions. Given that the null hypothesis is conventionally set as 
a no-effect one – such as “x does not entail y” – the choice of minimizing Type 
I error is biased by a fundamental asymmetry: the statistical test is set up to 
be more cautious about detecting something which in truth does not exist 
(Type I or α error), than about failing to find out something which in reality 
does exist (Type II or β error). Indeed, Type I error is set to 5%, which 
denotes the probability of a false positive, whereas Type II error is set to 20%, 
which indicates the probability of a false negative. 
Translated in environmental concerns, this means to set a null hypothesis 
such as “chemical x does not produce effect y”. Accordingly, the statistical test 
is set to be less careful about failing to detect a relation between x and y when 
it does exists in 20% of the cases. Otherwise said, actual statistics strictly 
requires a high and degree of certainty of harm before taking any preventive 
action11, whereas a precautionary approach claims for action even though 
scientific certainty has not yet been achieved. In the view of some scholars 
(Barrett and Raffenspenger, 1998; Kriebel et al., 2001), the way of 
incorporating the precautionary approach in statistical methodologies is by 
minimizing Type II error, so that “when there is substantial scientific 
uncertainty about the risks and benefits of a proposed activity, policy 
decisions [are] made in a way that errs on the side of caution with respect to 
the environment and the health of the public” (Kriebel et al., 2001: 875). 
Indeed, in epidemiology and biotechnology trials the language of “safety” 
assessment incorporates this kind of concern by requiring a sufficient 
statistical power or β probability (EFSA, 2006)12.  
While this solution is intuitively valid, at the same time it ignores that either 
probability α or β can be minimized, so that some bias will anyway persist. 
Furthermore, if β were the probability to be minimized, then the significance 
level α will rise and the threshold for rejecting the null hypothesis will be 
lowered (i.e. the “strictness” for accepting scientific evidence will be relaxed). 
Additionally, many concerns have been raised about using power analysis in 
environmental management studies, due to the likely smallness of sample size 
for which important effects may not be detected, and to the fact that growing 
                                                
11 This form of conservatism directly stems from the concept of opportunity-cost, 
where inaction is conceived to be a waste to be minimized more than an option value 
of being precautious (and waiting) before taking action. For references to the option-
value literature, see supra note 6. 
12 This requirement, however, has not been followed as many drugs-related cases 
have revealed, one among all the Vioxx litigation. 
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databases may lead to a situation in which ever-smaller differences are 
detected (McBride, 1999). Finally, as it shall be discussed later13, the choice 
about which type of error to minimize is strictly and conceptually connected 
to the way the null hypothesis is set. 
On the side of uncertainty about statistical results, several problems exist. To 
begin with, uncertainty is often confused with something that either is not 
valuable or lacks qualitative information. Nonetheless, it is still a fundamental 
character of many environmental mechanisms and surrounds the field of 
biotechnologies in particular. That is why its quantification in terms of limits 
of scientific knowledge and its communication to policy-makers is of 
fundamental importance. 
Today, the acknowledged sources of uncertainty in statistical testing mainly 
converge on sampling variability through the standard p-value and confidence 
intervals. On the other hand, several additional important factors are 
identified, such as the choice of the statistic value according to its desiderable 
properties and to the underlying population, and the sensitivity of the 
findings to the choice of the statistical model. 
Further critiques have been made on the ground that assumptions like 
independence among variables and the existence of random errors are 
inconsistent with many environmental and health-related events. This 
inadequacy prevents considering possible systematic errors that can originate 
from both selection bias and the very measurement of the levels of specific 
factors according to the availability of detecting technologies. Finally, 
methodological problems concerning the size and composition of the sample 
and the time extension of the experiment have been specifically advanced for 
GMOs’ safety studies, along with the difficulty if not impossibility of 
repeatedly replicating the experiments14.  
 
 
 
2.2.1. THE NOTION OF STATISTICAL EVIDENCE – 
ASSOCIATION VS. CAUSATION 
 
There is a second reason why the value of uncertainty is often 
underestimated, which stems from a fundamental confusion about the 
heuristic power of statistical inference. This situation puzzles the process of 
drawing conclusions both in case of non-significant results (i.e. those that fail 
                                                
13 See para. 3.3. 
14 The reference study is: Séralini, G-E., J. Spiroux de Vendomois and D. Cellier, 
“Criticism and Improvements of Strategies for the Safety Assessment of GM Plant 
derived Foods or Feed. An Answer to EFSA Draft Report on Animal Feeding Trials 
With GMOs”, obtained from a personal communication with Prof. Séralini, May 9th, 
2007. 
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to reject the null hypothesis) and in case of significant ones, where the 
passage from association to causation is problematic.  
Hypothesis testing provides a specific kind of information, which is about 
association between events, but never about causal relations between them. 
As Sir Austin Bradford Hill affirmed in his seminal article “The Environment 
and Disease: Association or Causation” (1965), “[significance] tests can, and 
should, remind us of the effects that the play of chance can create, and they 
will instruct us in the likely magnitude of those effects. Beyond that they 
contribute nothing to the ‘proof’ of our hypothesis”. 
The relation between association and causation could be better understood by 
taking advantage of some notions from epidemiology (Rothman and 
Greenland, 1998). Before claiming that association does not prove causation, 
the concept of cause must be better defined. 
First, the concept of a one-to-one correspondence between the cause and the 
effect shall be cleared. Fundaments of epidemiology instruct us that even if it 
is correct to define a cause of a specific event as “an antecedent event, 
condition, or characteristic […] without which the disease event either would 
not have occurred at all or would not have occurred until some later time” 
(Rothman and Greenland, 1998: 8), nonetheless the concept of “causal 
constellation of components” informs us that numerous and less evident 
causes operate for producing an effect. A complete causal mechanism is 
therefore one in which a “sufficient cause” is composed of minimal (i.e. 
necessary) conditions or events, each of them being part of a multiplicative 
function. 
The specification of the concept of causation endows us with a useful warning: 
in a causal chain, being each and every component necessary, the detection of 
possible associations is never exhaustive to account for a causal relationship. 
On the converse, the failure to detect an association between two events may 
hide a sufficient causation as soon as a third component is introduced in the 
chain.  
In particular, biological interactions are characterized by a high degree of 
uncertainty since most and sometimes even all of the components of a 
sufficient cause are unknown (Rothman and Greenland, 1998: 12). Moreover, 
even though interactions of this type are known as co-actions or joint actions, 
this does not mean that they are simultaneous: the effect of one component 
may interact with the other component with a possibly large delay. 
Back to the concept of significant or statistical evidence, the task of falsifying 
hypotheses is not aimed at giving a direct measure of, i.e. to quantify, the 
probability of the null hypothesis to be true. Rather, the task of hypothesis 
testing is to test the consistency, i.e. the reliability, of an association between 
experimental data and the null hypothesis (Adelman, 2004). More precisely, 
the association is reliable to the extent that the error rate is to be calculated 
by testing the likelihood of finding that particular (non-) association just by 
chance, either by a false positive (Type I error) or a false negative (Type II 
error). 
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Statistical significance, besides being not a causal criterion, is independent of 
important considerations such as the source of observational data, the degree 
by which the experiment conditions are controlled, the assumptions on the 
exposure levels (Adelman, 2004). Thus, through statistical significance alone 
any of this information would not be conveyed. 
On the side of low level or non-significant results, i.e. failing to reject the null 
hypothesis, missing information stems from the fact that these results are 
often not reported in scientific reports (Mayo, quoted in Adelman, 2004). 
Nonetheless, failing to detect an association between two events does not 
mean that the absence of evidence is the evidence of absence15, or that there is 
no effect, and more than ever it does not prove a negative, which is 
impossible16. That is why, even though scientists proceed by preponderance of 
evidence and parsimony among theories17, it could still be possible to make 
inference from absence, i.e. when the null hypothesis is not rejected. This 
happens only when we postulate the existence of an entity or phenomenon or 
in case of universal laws of nature: if no evidence to the contrary ever occurs 
then the absence results in support of the theory. So far, however, we have 
learnt from frequentist statistics that our assumptions are phrased as non-
existence ones. On the contrary, as it shall be discussed later18, the argument 
about the inference from absence is relevant to the extent that postulates or 
assumptions are to be questioned. 
Finally, the following remark will better explain possible misinterpretations 
of data once the object under control, i.e. environmental and human health 
effects, is dismissed in drawing conclusions about the test. In fact, it is not 
excludable that a situation of little consistency between data and the 
hypothesis be due to the fact that the object of prediction is a rare event, as it 
is likely to be in case of long term, low risk or catastrophic environmental 
effects. Similarly, Sunstein’s concept of “availability heuristic” (Sunstein, 2004; 
                                                
15 To prevent any abuse of this idea, Mano Singham writes in his web journal 
(available at 
http://blog.case.edu/singham/2006/05/11/burden_of_proof3_the_role_of_negative
_evidence), that “when you are asserting the existence of an entity, if you have not 
provided any evidence that they do exist, then the absence of evidence is evidence of 
absence”.   
16 The proof of the negative is a special case of the fallacy of denying the antecedent. 
See later para. 3.1. 
17 The principle of parsimony (or lex parsimoniae) in scientific theories is also known 
as the Ockham's razor principle. According to that, among competing theories only 
those that are based on the fewest assumptions should be retained, and conversely 
those that are useless (entia non sunt multiplicanda, translated: entities are not to 
proliferate) should be eliminated, or “shaved off”. As it is stated, it is by now the only 
method to choose between theories, for it aims at preventing congestion among 
theories with the risk of resulting in no scientific guidance; however, the use of 
negative proof in place of performing experiments is not justified, since all relevant 
data and all possible relevant experiments should be first exhausted. 
18 See para. 3.3. 
 11 
2005) shall exemplify how possible misperception occurs. If in fact we are 
confronted with two hypothesis, one very rare and the other very common, 
each of them having similar significant level of association with the same 
event, we will nonetheless tend to attribute the cause of the event to the most 
common situation so that the perception of the respective probabilities of the 
two events will result distorted.  
 
 
 
3. SCIENCE FOR POLICY AND POLICY FOR SCIENCE – CONTRIBUTION 
FROM THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE TO RECTIFY THE 
CONNUBIUM 
 
As it has been discussed, the precautionary principle has brought about 
interesting critiques to the traditional, i.e. frequentist, methodology of 
statistics by denouncing its implicit bias toward less precautionary actions. 
This is a great and constructive critique, but in order to retain the very useful 
lessons it is crucial to understand the fundaments of frequentist statistical 
analysis and the rationale of its methodology. 
The analysis will proceed along two tracks starting from the same origin: the 
concept of falsification. The first track is indispensable, in that philosophy of 
science will provide critical insights to fully understand the notion of 
scientific knowledge by broadening the discussion to the scientific method in 
general. The second track, on the other hand, will restrict the analysis, to 
discuss the critiques that have been addressed to the traditional frequentist 
methodologies for environmental effects. In particular, I will evaluate 
statistical methodologies for their desiderable conceptual methodological 
honesty, more precisely I will analyze the rationale behind frequentist 
statistical inference and its conventional way of setting the null hypothesis in 
order to surrender any simplistic controversy on the biotechnological debate. 
 
 
 
3.1. FALSIFICATION: INSIGHTS FROM PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE  
 
Although the critical analysis of the precautionary principle has its fulcrum on 
frequentist statistics, the borders of such debate extend to scientific methods 
in general (Barrett and Raffensperger, 1999; Jordan and O’Riordan, 1999). 
Philosophy of science is the discipline to refer to in that it critically instructs 
the discussion on the different aims and methods of science, along with its 
principles, practice and achievements (Salmon et al., 1999). 
During the twentieth century, the two dominant approaches to philosophy of 
science, the logical positivists (Vienna circle) and the logical empiricists 
(Berlin), despite their differences, focused both on the logical explanation of 
scientific concepts and on the relations between theory and evidence. 
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Through logic, science gained its unique and independent status of privileged 
discipline. 
Nonetheless, the logic force of scientific reasoning processed both through 
inference and deduction encountered authoritative counter-arguments. To 
begin with, David Hume (1739) questioned the authoritative power of 
inductivism19 for it was simply based on the assumption that observed events 
would be eventually following the same equal pattern that had been observed 
ever since. According to Hume, there was no necessity behind this reasoning 
and, most importantly, there was no reason to assign a causal connotation to 
a constant sequence of events. In fact, what could be at first deemed to be a 
causal relation, at the end, if ever an observation to the contrary had to occur, 
could have turned out to be a simple coincidence. This circumstance is also 
better known as the “fallacy of affirming the consequent”20, in which the logic 
failure originates from the fact that inference processes are not necessarily 
truth-preserving, which means that even if premises are true, conclusions can 
be false, and vice versa21 (Salmon et al., 1999).  
After that, scientific method was thus highly prejudiced, nonetheless the 
question remained: how to set a logical basis for it? This could be possible as 
long as the truth, what traditionally science had been devoted to, be 
distinguished from knowledge, or in different terms, the reason why a 
particular phenomenon occurs (cause and effect) had to be kept separate from 
the reason for believing that that phenomenon would ever occur.  
Karl Popper (1957; 1959) thought that scientific statements could never be 
proved to be logically true since the only information to be inferred was about 
the (in-)consistency between an initial hypothesis or assumption and a specific 
observation. Notably, scientific knowledge would have resulted in the 
following fundamental asymmetry: if in fact evidence of consistency between 
the result and the initial assumption could not have proven the latter to be 
true, on the other hand inconsistency was carrying a different heuristic power 
in that it could22 make the initial hypothesis to be disproved. Just one 
                                                
19 Inductivism is characterized by four major features (Salmon et al., 1999): it is 
ampliative in that the conclusion has a content that goes beyond the content of its 
premises; it is not necessarily truth-preserving, in that there could be true premises 
and false conclusions; it is not erosion-proof, in that new premises can completely 
undermine the argument; any combination of premises and conclusion (be them true 
and/or false) is possible for the validity of the argumentation to rest, that is why 
inductive arguments come in different degrees of strength. 
20 The general form of the fallacy of affirming the consequent is the following 
(Rothman and Greenland, 1998):  we have a premise which states that if H is true, 
then B must be true; we know through observation that B is true; therefore we 
conclude that H must be true. 
21 By contrast, deductive reasoning is truth-preserving in that if premises are true, 
then conclusion must be true as well. 
22 It is not automatic to disprove a hypothesis as soon as an observation to the 
contrary occurs especially if it has long been confirmed by evidence. This choice in 
fact depends on the scientific group conducing the analysis, which legitimately may 
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observation to the contrary had therefore the potential to break the supposed 
unequivocal deterministic chain. 
The great lesson from Popper, which statistical methodology has largely 
learnt, is that our knowledge comes from experimental science through a 
process of “conjecture and refutation” and, most importantly, from ignorance. 
Science proceeds by elimination and is therefore tentative in its essence. 
The provisional character of scientific explanations should not lead to prompt 
conclusions against the objective character of science and its capability of 
explaining how the world really works. Instead, the relevant question is 
whether the rejection paradigm will ultimately narrow scientific knowledge 
to the truth or not; in other terms, whether scientific objectivity is achievable 
at some end or it is rather a Kantian metaphysic23. 
The answer to this question is important in qualifying scientific uncertainty 
and its “waiting value”24. In fact, if we suppose that scientific knowledge is 
progressively improving, then there is an economic rationale for postponing 
costly preventive measures to the point where better, if not complete and 
perfect, information will allow us to make the optimal choice.  
In a similar vein, in epidemiology it is quite diffused the concept of the world 
ruled by a deterministic mechanism to be captured in its ultimate components 
through inference along with the hypothetico-deductive method. Room for 
chance considerations is thus the expression of our ignorance and it is only 
temporary, i.e. to be eliminated at some point in time. Nonetheless, even if 
temporary and incomplete, the knowledge we are endowed with at each time 
is still the basis of our actions and no delay will be legitimated just on the 
prospect of an improved knowledge. As Rothman and Greenland (1998: 22) 
warn, “the tentativeness of our knowledge [will] not prevent practical 
applications, but it should keep us skeptical and critical”. I do see in this way 
of defining scientific knowledge a sharp orientation to some form of 
precaution, by which scientific uncertainty is reconsidered for its 
encouragement to dialectic and so the opposition between the precautionary 
principle and science gradually evanishes. 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
deem an “alien” observation as a simple anomaly. This happens mainly in 
epidemiologic studies and generally in scientific disciplines where improvements 
occur through the criteria of preponderance of evidence. 
23 Immanuel Kant in the Critique of the Pure Reason (1781) believed that complete 
knowledge of the world was not possible, still that kind of knowledge could be 
interpreted as metaphysical in that, although not achievable, it provided us with the 
aim to which our attempts reached for in a continuous escalating process. 
24 Gollier and Treich (2003) marked the difference between preventive effort and 
precautionary effort by referring, respectively, to the static of risk management at a 
given time with a stable probability distribution and, on the other hand, to the 
dynamic of scientific progress (and scientific uncertainty) over time. “In short, while 
prevention aims at managing risks, precaution aims at managing the wait for better 
scientific information” (Gollier and Treich, 2003, supra note 6 at 86). 
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3.2. EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE  
 
The last statement of the previous paragraph allows us to introduce a 
sociological discourse about scientific knowledge. This is particularly relevant 
insofar as it provides serious elements for bridging the alleged opposition 
between science and policy and it illustrates the operational value of the 
precautionary principle. 
In the first half of the Seventies, critiques had emerged against this sort of 
untouchable notion of science. Thomas Kuhn (1962) became known as one of 
the leaders of these sentiments and decried the unacceptable underestimation 
of the history of science, of its progress and cultural dimension. In his 
thoughts, the critical decision about which problems should be given priority 
and how to interpret statistical results could not be understood without a 
social lens. Precisely, refutation was part of a decision-making process where 
the consensus of the scientific community determined what to accept and 
what to reject25. That choice in fact entailed alternative considerations about 
the validity of the theory being tested (the initial hypothesis) against the 
validity of the scientific infrastructure, intended as the prevailing science, the 
so-called “normal” science (Rothman and Greenland, 1998). 
The claim that science is a “social construction” should terribly hurt any 
scholar spending his or her life searching for a rule, if not the rule, about some 
process, being it scientific, social or economic. Nevertheless, such a hurting 
feeling is the product of idolizing scientific knowledge, whose source of 
validity partly comes from our postulates or premises. Once acknowledged 
that those are hostage of our contingent interaction with the natural world, 
then it naturally follows that they prominently affect methodologies, aims and 
principles of scientific research, let alone the interpretative conclusions.  
Bayesianism addresses this specific problem in that no deductive argument 
can ever provide the information about the truth or falsity of a scientific 
hypothesis unless there is certainty about the truth of the premises. This fact 
is the consequence of the truth-preserving characteristic of deduction, i.e. if 
the premises are true, then the conclusions must be true26 (Samuel et al., 
1999).  
As it has already been discussed, we construct our premises on observation, 
but observation is possibly undermined by random or systematic errors, so 
that no inference about some association between two events can ever be 
proved true, but only disproved (or falsified). If scientific proof is impossible, 
as Hume teaches us, then no premise can ever be deemed completely certain 
                                                
25 See supra note 22 (anomalies). 
26 This property directly comes from the complementary ones informing that, as all 
the content of the conclusion is at least implicitly present in the premises, deduction 
is non-ampliative. For sake of completeness, two more characteristics of deduction 
exist: it is erosion-proof, i.e. if new premises are added and the previous are not 
erased, then the argument remains valid; and deductive validity is all-or-nothing 
matter, no degree consideration of validity is admissible (Samuel et al., 1999). 
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and consequently even no deduction reasoning can ever be certain. This is 
both a dilemma and a vicious cycle, for if inference carried no logical 
foundation, the drama is further amplified by the fact that deduction has no 
scientific utility (Rothman and Greenland, 1998). 
Then, if it is not truth, what does deduction preserve? Deduction preserves 
subjective probabilities, or degrees of certainty, that we attach to premises. 
Once assigned, the rules of probability theory would solve the problem by 
producing a logical, valid, personal certainty of conclusion. 
If inference is subjective because it is built upon postulates, then the scientist’s 
state of mind becomes truly important in determining which theories and 
methodologies will be applied. This is a critical factor that can be linked to the 
uncertainty-related communication problem discussed in paragraph 2.2, for 
scientific results may appear to policy-makers to be more certain than they 
actually are, due to the missing consideration of initial assumptions.  
 
 
 
3.2.1. THE QUALITY OF UNCERTAINTY: A NEW AMBITION 
FOR POST-NORMAL SCIENCE 
 
Once acknowledged that science is not a value-free discipline, many would 
conclude that we are depriving its protective function of legitimating policy 
decisions and, mostly, its capability of providing a common ground of 
agreement. Different points regarding the concept of science, its tasks, and its 
consensus-gathering force should be made against this alarmist view. 
The need to rethink scientific knowledge originates from a twofold concern, 
which is to denounce together its anachronistic march toward risk 
management and the denial of the cultural and public dimension of that same 
march. It is no wonder that the human capacity to address problems such as 
loss of biodiversity, climate change, resource depletion and other related 
issues, is in doubt, because “…facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes 
high, and decisions urgent” (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991: 138). This state 
given, the need for a new conceptualization of science has emerged as 
impellent for adjusting its ambitions to the new global challenges.  
Barrett and Raffensperger (1998) make an interesting conceptualization about 
scientific knowledge that allows us to integrate the notion of uncertainty, 
which instead has generally been separately advocated as the core reason for 
invoking precautionary actions as opposed to science-based actions. They 
identify “sound” or “industrial”27 science as the authoritative source of 
decision-making for environmental policies. Industrial science is characterized 
by the strict association with risk assessment and considers uncertainty as “a 
temporary and surmountable lack of data” (Barrett and Raffensperger, 1998: 
2). Conversely, they suggest the need of an alternative conceptualization of 
                                                
27 The industrialization of science is characterized by capital-intensity and 
commissioned research.  
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science, now called “biosystems” science, without which it is not possible to 
comprehend the rationale behind the precautionary principle. If we concede 
that uncertainty covers a large portion of environmental science – not only 
due the lack of data but also for the ecosystems’ inherent complexity, non-
linearity and impracticable experimental replication of environmental testing; 
and if we conceive that this uncertainty, rather than being a “temporary 
misalignment of theory and observation” (Barrett and Raffensperger, 1998: 5), 
is the product of indeterminacy as opposed to determinacy, then the value of 
waiting changes. In fact, instead of leading necessarily to more certainty, 
progressive environmental studies can increase the areas of disagreement, as 
it is to be expected from non-linear systems. This point is truly crucial in that 
it marks a detachment from anything it has been said so far: besides 
arguments that science is neither deterministic28, nor it will ultimately 
provide complete understanding of the world, still the supposed progressive 
narrowing of scientific uncertainty through falsification is now challenged.  
Whether or not scientific progress will ultimately achieve complete 
explanation of phenomena to let calculations predict the future, it is still 
arguable that science communalizes opinions and, by consequence, provides a 
protective shield of legitimacy for any action based on its prescriptions. For 
that reason, instead of truth, science should tend toward quality of 
information, which is defined as “the degree to which the recommended policy 
choices are robust against […] underlying uncertainties” (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz, 1994: 202). In this approach, the relation between quality and 
uncertainty is not at all of antithesis, but rather of transparence, completeness 
and even “honesty of evidence”29. Moreover, being uncertainty pervasive and 
stakes high for many environmental issues, quality, as the new leading 
principle of the “post-normal” science, advocates democratization of 
knowledge through extended peer-communities (Funtowics and Ravetz, 
1991, 1994; Norgaard, 2006).  
The idea of democratizing knowledge is strictly connected to a critical 
approach toward economics, for its one-dimensional standard of valuation, i.e. 
monetization30, is incapable of comprehending all the uncertainties and 
complexities of the environmental problem. This sentiment introduces the 
second part of the scientific discourse in its social dimension. As Wynne 
(2002) tries to explain, our time is experiencing an increasing disconnection 
                                                
28 Cfr. association and causation at para. 2.2.1. 
29 In this context, the expression “honesty of evidence” has an epistemological 
connotation, but that will be further extended to a methodological discourse (see para. 
3.3.).  
30 In this critique, Funtowics and Ravetz (1994) try to define the new paradigm of 
ecological economics as a “post-normal” science, in which all the complexities of 
environmental problems – including economic, ethical and social considerations – are 
to be held together in the rule of multidisciplinarity. Nonetheless, to give monetary 
value to natural resources and even to ecosystem’s services is still advocated by some 
authors, e.g. Costanza et al. (1997), as the meaning to create a common perception of 
the costs of global problems such as natural resources depletion, climate change, etc. 
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between the public on the one hand and policy and science on the other. The 
importance of Wynne’s article is that it draws attention to the institutional 
component of the scientific discourse. His analysis of environmental policies, 
to the extent that they are related to technological progress, goes beyond the 
mere legacy of uncertainty: it is not just about not having of all information to 
take action, it is further about denying what it is at stake, which represents 
the source of ambiguous decisions. Science has been building its authoritative 
role in policy-making upon the task of calculating and controlling risk. Hence, 
we have reached the stage in which any decision based on risk assessment 
should naturally be acceptable, legitimate. Risk appears as the deus ex-machina 
to the crucial economic problem of aggregating people’s different preferences, 
due to its universal flavor. Once risk has been calculated and consequences 
have become known and controllable, no room is left for other considerations, 
such as the source of risk or the motivations behind the decision of (not-
)incurring the risk. Thus, ambiguity of decisions originating from possible 
additional considerations is simply written off and attention to what is at 
stake is diverted. 
The denial of ambiguity produces disaffection toward the “dominant 
scientific-institution risk culture” (Wynne, 2002: 460) among lay people 
because they are deprived of their dialectic space. Furthermore, the problem 
of this disconnection between the public on the one hand and policy and 
science on the other is far from being acknowledged in the form that has been 
expressed. Instead, it is often reduced to a fundamental opposition between 
risk-perception and risk-science, respectively related to lay people and the 
experts. In this vein, disagreement on technocratic policy-making is no more 
than the result of misperception of risk and, more provocatively, this status is 
at the origin of supporting precautionary actions. Sunstein (2005: 35) 
introduces one of his paragraph by stating: “I suggest that the 
[precautionary] principle becomes operational if and only if those who apply 
it wear blinders – only, that is, if they focus on some aspects of the regulatory 
situation but downplay or disregard others”. It is needless to say that the 
aspects on which Sunstein believes supporters of the precautionary principle 
would base their actions, are the product of risk misperception31. His 
arguments of behavioral economics carry their validity if and only if they are 
abstracted from “what it is at stake”. And that is precisely what he does by 
denying ambiguity. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
31 Sunstein (2005), by borrowing fundamental concepts from behavioral economics 
and cognitive psychology, identifies five sources of misperception of risk: the 
availability heuristic, probability neglect, loss aversion, a belief in the benevolence of 
nature and system neglect. 
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3.3. FALSIFICATION: THE SOURCE OF METHODOLOGICAL 
INTEGRITY  
 
Besides scientific epistemology discourses, the falsification process shows its 
relevance in that it promotes what can be called methodological “honesty” and 
controls for the object of analysis. To begin with, the first question to ask is: 
“Why should we prove something by following a counterintuitive process, i.e. 
by falsifying it?”.  
The relevance of complicating the process of statistical inference lies in the 
sake of providing objective analysis, or, equally, avoiding possible biases. 
The initial point to retain is that before setting the null hypothesis there is an 
earlier stage in which we formulate a conjecture (also called research 
hypothesis), if not a suspect, about some possible event. This conjecture is 
precisely what triggers the statistical analysis and what we subsequently try 
to support by refuting the null hypothesis. Anyway, rejecting the null 
hypothesis requires a high degree of certainty so that the evidence of some 
effect could be confidently deemed scientific. The concept of “supporting by 
falsifying” is pivotal and it has to be strictly retained along with all the 
discussion.   
For instance, we may suspect a chemical to have some negative effects on 
human health. If we were to set the null hypothesis in the same form of our 
conjecture, such as “chemical x causes harm to human health”, then our 
analysis would be biased from the very beginning, since we would concentrate 
all our efforts to prove what actually is a personal allegation. In other terms, 
because we tend to commit ourselves to personal beliefs, unexpected 
discoveries could turn out to be very disappointing, therefore to be avoided.  
Discussions about how we should formulate assumptions have rarely been 
made, but as we have learnt from the history of philosophy of science, those 
are fundamental to the result of the analysis. From Bayesianism we know that 
posterior probabilities strictly depend on prior probabilities, but even without 
this crucial lesson it is possible to reach a similar conclusion by directing our 
mind to the concept of falsification.  
 
 
 
3.3.1. THE RATIONALE OF STATISTICAL CONVENTIONS: 
ADAPTATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 
 
Refutation is the basis of scientific knowledge, whose soundness is so crucial 
in our society that it requires a high degree of certainty and thus compels to 
restrict as much as possible the probability of error. The crucial question is 
then “erring about what?”. By answering this question, we know what we 
want to control: in fact, we want to avoid producing scientific information 
which is not scientific at all, and the best way to preserve the basis of science, 
i.e. falsification, is minimizing the possibility of rejecting the null hypothesis 
when in fact it is true (i.e. Type I error).  
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Type II error is not as serious as Type I, because failing to refute the null 
hypothesis when it is false does not entail that we accept it as true. We just do 
not know. Because of this asymmetry between Type I and II errors, we 
already know that the probability α is more important to minimize, for sure. 
What is then to be discussed is its complement, the null hypothesis.  
As it was explained in paragraph 2.1, it is convention in significance 
hypothesis testing to postulate a no-effect null hypothesis, such as “chemical x 
does not cause harm to human health (or to a specific environment)”. For 
those who are familiar with environmental concerns, this particular setting 
could immediately raise some conceptual problems. In fact, that hypothesis is 
far from expressing concern and precaution about potentially harmful effects. 
Statisticians would reply to this kind of perplexity by saying that the way the 
null hypothesis is set is the product of convention. Then, to better understand 
the situation let us temporarily overcome skepticism and maintain the default 
rule of a no-effect null hypothesis. The subsequent stage is to minimize one 
type of random error (and, conversely, maximize the other). Again, 
conventionally, the error to be minimized is Type I or α error, which occurs 
when the null hypothesis is rejected while it is in fact true. Translated in 
environmental terms, this choice would entail minimizing the possibility of 
detecting an environmentally dangerous effect, which in reality does not 
exist, and, consequently, to maximize the possibility of failing to detect the 
same effect when in reality it does exist. 
This time, the earlier skepticism against conventional statistical methodology 
could not be surmounted: in fact, even supposing that the way the null 
hypothesis is conceived is, at least intentionally, not biased, certainly the 
preference for controlling Type I error is.  
Why then these conventions should be maintained? One plausible reason 
consists in our legal and cultural apprehension that someone is presumed 
innocent until proven guilty. This is the same reason why even those 
defendants who themselves claim to be guilty – as it happened for example 
during the terrorism period in Italy in the Seventies – are to be given the 
possibility of a trial. Until no positive evidence has been delivered and a 
burden of persuasion has been reached, nobody can be said to be guilty. In 
statistical terms, this entails that the null hypothesis be a no-effect one. 
Given the effect to be controlled, the choice of Type I error is due to a 
reasonable concern, which is convicting someone who is in fact a victim. This 
kind of error is abhorred in our western society, so that we can all agree that 
the concern about controlling Type I error is truly founded and therefore is 
the one to be minimized. Nevertheless, is this not precisely a kind of 
precautionary approach toward the weakest part, i.e. the victim? I believe it is 
and, differently from what is generally considered, this attitude does not 
directly stem from the type of error we choose to minimize, but rather from 
the way the null hypothesis is constructed to integrate a specific concern.  
The reason of this claim is rooted on the fact that the way the null hypothesis 
is constructed and the decision of minimizing one type of error are part of the 
same rule: first do no harm. On the one side, the scientific attitude instructs us 
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to discourage at most the probability of committing an error, especially the 
error of claiming that something is certain (i.e. scientific) when in fact it is 
not; on the other side, the object of our concern is not shielded by the type of 
error we want to minimize, but, rather and before, by the assumption we 
make of it. We are already precautious about a specific circumstance at the 
moment we construct the null-hypothesis, so that the decision about which 
error to minimize naturally follows. As it shall be discussed in paragraph 
3.3.2, if the null-hypothesis already includes the object of our concern, then 
the type of error to minimize is always Type I. 
Let us now move specifically to the GMOs issue. We know from above how 
the null hypothesis is set and which error to control for32. Following the same 
rationale as for not convicting a victim, we should assure that we do not 
conclude that GMOs are unsafe (or at least that they exceed a certain risk 
standard) when actually they are not, so as to avoid overregulation33. At the 
same time, as we cannot simultaneously minimize Type I and Type II errors, 
the latter is conversely maximized in such a way that the possibility of 
underregulating a specific GMO, when in fact it poses risks to human health 
(or the environment), raises less concern. 
In this case, something seems to be changed. That is precisely our concern, 
due to the fact that what was before identified as a potential victim raising 
feelings of protection, now has become a possible risk or hazard which creates 
totally different perception of who is at this point the weakest part to protect. 
This change happens because the object of the analysis itself, along with the 
new distributional issues it raises, has been modified.  
At this time, political as well as social considerations enter the discussion 
insofar as they attach different values to different objects of regulation and, 
consequently, different types of errors. Type I and Type II errors suffer from 
an asymmetry of “contingent importance”, insofar as the cost of erring 
respectively on the side of underregulation and overregulation pivots around 
the contingency of the concern. It is precisely that, along with the available 
scientific knowledge, which triggers decisions in favor of more or less 
precaution. For this reason, the peculiarity of the object of analysis should 
never be dismissed against conventional methodological rules and our 
postulates should always find their proper analytical contextualization and 
never become obsolete alongside the path of research. 
 
 
 
                                                
32 In the special case of GMOs, the null hypothesis setting is based on the assumption 
that GMO and their wild counterpart, non-GMOs, are “substantially equivalent”. 
The concept of substantial equivalence is the key for a comparative assessment, in 
which traditionally cultivated crops have gained a history of safe use so that they 
provide the baseline for determining any substantial difference between the GMO and 
its wild counterpart (EFSA, 2006). 
33 See para. 3.3.2, Shapiro (1995). 
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3.3.2. ISSUES OF GUIDANCE - SUBJECT, POTENTIAL VICTIM 
AND OBJECT: QUESTIONS OF BIAS 
 
As it should have emerged, the potential victim of the case has been changed. 
Furthermore, the victims are potentially numerous, probabilities of incurring 
in the same risk are likely to be correlated among individuals, and finally risk 
is largely replaced by uncertainty and, possibly, by fundamental uncertainty34. 
Once agreed that different issues entail different costs and concerns, it is 
useful to find a guiding rule for setting the null hypothesis appropriately and, 
accordingly, decide which error to minimize. Bearing in mind the 
complementarity between the two, the attentive reader should have realized 
that the kinds of environmental critiques moved against statistical 
methodologies (para. 2.2.) – along with suggestions to simply minimize Type 
II instead of Type I error – may hide methodological as well as interpretative 
failures. In fact, as α or β cannot be simultaneously minimized, either power 
analysis is performed while β is still maximized, or β is minimized with the 
inconvenience of conversely raise the rejection region denoted by α, which 
will enlarge the boundaries of accepting evidence as scientific when in fact it 
is not. 
Besides these reasons, additional issues are to be developed on the side of the 
burden of proof. 
To begin with, as discussed by Shapiro (1995), in condition of uncertainty – 
which is precisely the case for GMOs – the errors of overregulation and 
underregulation have different costs and different bearers, respectively the 
industry and the individuals. This said, his position is one of advocating 
fairness by setting the burden of uncertainty about potential risk on the 
industry rather than individuals, since the former is the least cost bearer. 
Again, we should always keep in mind the question “who is the weakest part, 
who is the potential victim, who should be protected”, given a particular 
concern. The rule for setting the burden of proof directly comes from its 
complementary, i.e. the identification of the potential victim, so that the onus 
of proof is on the non-victim part. 
So far, we know the object of the study, i.e. GMOs, we know the potential 
victims, we know the least-cost bearer that should carry the burden of proof, 
but we still do not know what we have to prove: either the existence of some 
harm or the existence of some safety35. To this matter, it is crucial to consider 
                                                
34 Since Knight (1921) the distinction between risk and uncertainty has become 
relevant to the extent that the first is characterized by an objective probability 
distribution, while for the second there exists no precise statistical estimates. 
Fundamental uncertainty, or ignorance, is distinguished from simple uncertainty by 
the fact that the impossibility of attaching accurate probabilities to possible scenarios 
derives from the impossibility of even conceiving those scenarios, because the 
information required does not exist at the decision time. 
35 Neither of the two is of course possible to prove in absolute and deterministic terms 
(cfr. para. 3.1.), so that by using the word “proving” the referee is always some 
preponderance of evidence. 
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the subject conducing the analysis, since, while keeping the rationale of 
falsifying the null hypothesis, possible bias will arise on the setting of the null 
hypothesis and on the choice to minimize one specific type of error. In fact, it 
is needless to say that a study on the same matter committed by an 
environmentalist organization and by an oil company would be biased in 
opposite directions.  
For these reasons, I believe that the allocation of the burden of proof could 
not be reasoned without at the same time reconsidering statistical hypothesis 
testing. More precisely, this is not just a question of bias, but also and further 
a question of giving an incentive that is consistent both with the personal 
interests of the agent (e.g. selling GMOs) and the need to have honest 
scientific conclusions. Thus, a consistent incentive is one that leads the agent 
to canalize all his efforts to find out what he desires, that is to falsify (make 
scientific highly certain statements about) what is does not desire, i.e. the 
GMOs to be unsafe. This twofold concern stemming from the burden of proof 
is easily explained through an example: let us set the null hypothesis in the 
conventional manner, “GMOs have no effect on human health”. Bearing in 
mind the WTO case of the EU-Biotech dispute, the parties willing to 
commercialize GMOs in the European market are the ones that, according to 
the precautionary principle, should prove that no risk to human health arises 
from their action. However, in the WTO Biotech dispute the complainants are 
of course to do their interest, which is to market GMOs, but the starting 
assumption that GMOs are safe would clearly bias their research. 
To make the point clearer, rejecting the null hypothesis would mean that the 
experiments have provided high evidence that undesirable effects caused by 
GMOs actually exist. In order to come up with such a preponderance of 
evidence, a high degree of certainty – and effort – is required by setting a very 
low, 5% or 1%, significance level α. If, on the contrary, this preponderant 
evidence is not reached, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, neither 
can it be accepted as true: this means that scientific statements about the 
safety of the product are not allowed and the potential danger cannot be 
excluded. However, it is practice to draw scientific conclusions of no-effect 
evidence by failing to reject the null hypothesis or, conversely, by failing to 
detect a statistically significant association (Parkhurst, 2001). 
Let us now try to build a counter-example: the null hypothesis is “the GMO 
has adverse effect y on human health (or on biodiversity)”. The GMO 
producer, who has the burden of proof, will convey all his effort to reject the 
null hypothesis in order to build up evidence about their safety. Differently 
from the scenario of a no-effect null hypothesis, the GMO producer will be 
required a high level of certainty to prove that the GMO is preponderantly 
safe, whereas the benefit of doubt about their harmfulness directly coming 
from the non-refutation of the null hypothesis, will be left to consumers. 
However, there is a practical problem of putting the hypothesis in the 
affirmative form. In fact, in this case the adverse effect to test has to be 
specified. A no-effect hypothesis, in accordance with the principle of 
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substantial equivalence36, presumes that the ingestion of GMOs produces no 
change in the key nutrients or anti-nutrients of the plant. This form of 
hypothesis does not require specifying all kinds of expected effects, since in 
case some effects were detected, their specification would be made at the time 
they are observed. On the contrary, an effect-null hypothesis requires 
indicating a priori the specific effect to be concerned with. 
Given that there is a huge portion of uncertainty about possible effects of 
GMOs both on biodiversity and on human health, this situation is truly 
problematic. How to find a compromise between the incentive effect that has 
been exposed and the practicability of it? 
At this point, it is helpful to revise alternative statistical testing. Proposals 
have been advanced to introduce equivalence testing as substitute for 
(McBride, 1999) or additional stage to (Parkhurst, 2001) traditional 
hypothesis testing. Equivalence testing requires the null hypothesis to 
incorporate the concern that two similar products may differ in some of their 
characteristics. This, for example, happens to be used for drugs testing. 
Filtered down into the GMOs issue, this implies that instead of assuming that 
GMOs and non-GMOs are substantially equivalent37, the two are presumed 
to be “bioinequivalent” (McBride, 1999: 3). This is certainly the first step for 
incorporating a precautionary approach. Furthermore and strictly related to 
the problem of specifying the type of effect to be studied, zero-valued38 point 
estimates are replaced by intervals determining the bioequivalence region. 
The null hypothesis is set in such a manner as the difference between the 
parameters of the test GMO and reference non-GMO is lower and greater of, 
respectively, the lower and upper bounds of the interval. The size of the 
equivalence interval is decided before performing the test (or it can be 
extracted from an already set regulatory standard) to formalize all the set of 
differences which are of no practical importance. 
Hence, equivalence testing is an important statistic tools in that it makes it 
possible to incorporate the precautionary principle while maintaining the 
scientific rationale of falsifying the null hypothesis and controlling for Type I 
error. On one side, refutation of the null hypothesis now implies that high 
certainty is required to conclude that GMOs are as safe as their natural 
counterparts, whereas failing to reject the null hypothesis now implies that 
the doubt39 on possible danger will at most err on the side of more precaution. 
On the other side, given that Type I error was previously identified as the 
crucial one for deriving statistically significant inferences, the issue of concern 
is now to reject that GMOs are not as safe as their counterparts, i.e. finding 
that they are as safe as their counterparts, when this is not true.  
                                                
36 See supra note 32. 
37 See supra note 32. 
38 The point estimate is zero because it informs that the point hypothesis is a no-effect 
one. 
39 Remember that failing to reject the null hypothesis does not entail that it is to be 
accepted or confirmed to be true. 
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To conclude, the relevance of equivalence testing has emerged gradually 
along with a train of thoughts that took into consideration the object of 
concern, the potential victim and the least-cost bearer carrying the onus of 
the proof. The key message is that all those components have to be – and had 
been – balanced against the “scientific power” of statistical methodologies, in 
order to build a scenario of highly scientific results to be produced 
consistently with the interests of both the potential injurer and the potential 
victim. The former will in fact be required to put all his effort in producing 
high-evidence results that GMOs are safe instead of benefiting from doubts 
about their harmfulness; the latter, conversely, will benefit from 
precautionary science. 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
When Sir Austin Bradford Hill (1965) illustrated in his article nine aspects to 
consider in order to deduce likely causation from association, his prescriptions 
were welcomed as rules for cause-effect decision-making. As some scientists 
have pointed out, more important lessons were unfortunately missed (Phillips 
and Goodman, 2004).  
His stress on contingency of evaluation (“the evidence is there to be judged on 
its merits”) and on the importance of the object at stake (“…we may surely 
ask what is involved in our decision”) perfectly incorporated all the relevant 
concerns and reasons for taking precautionary actions. The estimation of the 
value of waiting against the value of taking action “will depend upon 
circumstances”, upon the information we have at our disposal (“the whole 
chain [of cause-effect] may have to be unrevealed or a few links may suffice”). 
On the same idea, the aim of our action “almost inevitably leads us to 
introduce differential standards before we convict”, so that even in the 
presence of weak evidence precautionary actions can be undertaken and “if we 
are wrong in deducing causation from association no great harm will be 
done”40. 
The importance of environmental studies does not need to be shouted any 
more; nonetheless this has often resulted in big noise about environmental 
policy rules (Wynne et al., 1996). I do believe this is the product of the 
difficulty of tackling the environmental issue through a multidisciplinary 
perspective. The debate about the precautionary principle has further 
sharpened this situation and a new need for clarification has become 
compelling. In particular, the paradox of scientific knowledge being used to 
                                                
40 In this statement, Hill was presenting the example of introducing a drug for early-
morning sickness in pregnant women. As he said, the doctor can decide to restrict the 
use of the drug even on relatively slight evidence, the fact being that the “good lady 
and the pharmaceutical industry will doubtless survive”. 
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delegitimate environmental policies at the international level need to be 
solved, and for that a tentative preapprehension of science in its statistical 
formulation has been made to eventually determine the relation between 
scientific and legal standards of persuasion. 
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